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INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship, indeed the legal system itself, has often argued that the United States
Supreme Court merely settles Constitutional principles in a contemporary context. It is a system
that argues objectivity and places heavy emphasis on its past decisions in deciding new cases.
Yet occasionally, the courts have reversed what had been settled law for many decades. One such
instance was Brown v. Board of Education, the 1954 landmark school desegregation case, when
the Court unanimously invalidated the application of Plessy v. Ferguson.1 Under the holding of
Plessy, separate public school facilities were considered constitutional as long as they were
equal.2 Brown generated a great deal of controversy and resistance among Southern whites,
leading to much discussion (popular, political, and scholarly) of the school segregation decisions
of the lower federal courts, the institutions subsequently charged with enforcing Brown. Most
common is a narrative of increasing racial egalitarianism, echoed by the Court most notably in its

* Erica Frankenberg (Ed.D., Harvard University) is an assistant professor in the Department of Education Policy Studies
in the College of Education at the Pennsylvania State University. The author wishes to thank Preston Green and Leah
Aden for helpful comments on this draft and Evelyn Brooks Higginbotham for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks also
to Tiffanie Lewis for her help.
1

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494–95 (1954).

2

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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Loving decision overturning a Virginia law banning interracial marriage.3 “We have consistently
denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the rights of citizens on the account of
race,” the Court held just thirteen years after Brown.4
Although school desegregation decisions concern the racial ideologies and classifications
that govern society, legal scholarship rarely focuses on how contemporary understandings about
race affected these decisions.5 This is particularly important at the district court level where much
of the social science evidence about the effects of racial discrimination is presented. I argue that,
in examining the four district court opinions that were eventually consolidated into Brown upon
appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, the influence of new understandings about race on the district
court judges was limited. Only one judge, Waties Waring in South Carolina, questioned not only
the role that race and racism played in creating a segregated society, but also the very notion of
race, in deciding that segregated schools were unconstitutional. Although the plaintiffs in all four
cases were represented by NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) lawyers who included social
science evidence questioning the “separate but equal” premise of Plessy in their constitutional
arguments, the degree to which social science infused the judge’s opinions ’varied widely from
case to case.
In Part I, before analyzing the district court opinions, I review law journals’ treatment of
race in the years preceding the lower courts’ decisions. I next examine the decisions in the four
cases: Davis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia, in Part II; Brown v.
Board of Education of Topeka, in Part III; Gebhart v. Belton, from New Castle County Delaware,
in Part IV; and Briggs v. Elliott, on appeal from Clarendon County, South Carolina in Part V.
Part VI examines the lone dissent in the four cases of Judge Waties Waring in the Clarendon
County, South Carolina case. The Article concludes in Part VII.
Our society continues to grapple with racial inequality and segregation in the nation’s
public schools, and indeed may be undoing much of the progress that came after the Brown
decision.6 In addition to judicial questions about the contemporary nature of race and racial
classification,7 as was the case in many of the district court opinions preceding Brown, social
science still only has limited influence in informing school segregation decisions.8
3

See generally Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).

4

Id. at 11–12.

5

See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). This case is the
latest in a long line of cases that demonstrates hostility towards any governmental decision-making that uses racial
classifications. For example, Chief Justice Roberts quoted Adarand, writing “[D]istinctions between citizens solely
because of their ancestry are by their very nature odious to a free people whose institutions are founded upon the doctrine
of equality” Id. at 745–46 (internal quotations omitted). Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion does question the racial
classifications the school districts employed—suggesting that “white” and “non-white” were “crude racial categories.” Id.
at 786. Neither of these statements, however, question the fundamental concept of race despite more recent social science
acceptance that race is socially constructed. See generally Ian F. Haney Lopez, The Social Construction of Race: Some
Observations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1 (1994) (arguing that objective
categories of race, such as Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid, are an illusion, but that social constructions of race are
very real).
6
GARY ORFIELD, UCLA CIVIL RIGHTS PROJECT, REVIVING THE GOAL OF AN INTEGRATED SOCIETY: A 21ST
CENTURY CHALLENGE 3 (2009) (reporting that fifty-five years after the Brown decision, schools in the United States are
more segregated than ever); see also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 803.
7

Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Reflects on First Years on Court, N. Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2011, at A17 (expressing
Justice Sotomayor’s skepticism at Chief Justice Roberts “simple” view of race and colorblindness).
8

See generally Erica Frankenberg & Liliana M. Garces, The Use of Social Science Evidence in Parents
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RACE IN CONTEMPORARY LAW JOURNALS

Before turning to an examination of the district court decisions, I first review how legal
journal articles wrote about race in the early 20th century. These prominent journals are the most
likely contemporary sources to have been read by judges and to have influenced their thinking.
Law professor Herbert Hovenkamp argues that social science knowledge can affect judges in two
ways: (1) by formally presenting generally agreed upon facts on point to the case at hand,9 and (2)
by being part of the way judges understand or have internalized accepted facts and science.10
Leading law journals in the decades prior to the school segregation cases discussed the growing
importance of social science as a means of illuminating legal problems. These articles made
frequent references to social science’s understandings about race and the effect of racial
discrimination in society. Felix Frankfurter wrote one such article in the early 1930s.11 At the
time of the article’s publication, Frankfurter was a professor at Harvard Law School. He was
subsequently appointed to the Supreme Court and was a Justice on the Court at the time of Brown.
In this article, Frankfurter suggested that social science could give lawyers and judges new
information and contextualize prior knowledge in a new perspective.12 In reviewing a newly
published encyclopedia of social sciences, he specifically cited Franz Boas’ article on
anthropology as perhaps being more helpful than a “technically legal article.”13 By 1911, Boas
had begun to show that the physical traits of Negroes that differed from those of whites were not
inheritable, but due to environmental causes, which attacked previously held notions of “scientific
racism” that assumed physical characteristics differ predictably by race.14 A Yale Law Journal
review of Boas’ 1928 Anthropology and Modern Life discussed at some length his argument for
the complexity of humans and the likelihood that racial purity did not exist and lauded the
application of anthropology to the study of contemporary problems.15 The work of Gunnar
Myrdal, who differed from Boas in focusing on the role of race in American society as opposed to
the concept of race itself, was also cited often in law reviews, particularly those articles directly
questioning the constitutionality of segregation in education.16
Involved and Meredith: Implications for Researchers and Schools, 46 LOUISVILLE L. REV. 703 (2008) (analyzing the use
and misuse of social science evidence in the five opinions in the Parents Involved decision).
9
One such brief was filed with the Supreme Court by a handful of prominent social scientists when the
Brown cases were heard by the Court. See Robert L. Carter et al., The Effects of Segregation and the Consequences of
Desegregation: A Social Science Statement, J. OF NEGRO EDUC. 68 (1953). Most notably, psychological research about
race by Kenneth Clark of the City College of New York was summarized in this brief and in the subsequent decision in
Brown. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
10

See Herbert Hovenkamp, Social Science and Segregation before Brown, 1985 DUKE L.J. 624, 627 (1985).
Hovenkamp reviewed the advances in social science knowledge about race from the first decade of the twentieth century
and argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions for the fifty-year period after Plessy “closely tracked prevailing scientific
opinion on race.” Id. at 664.
11

Felix Frankfurter, Book Review, 44 HARV. L. REV. 137, 147–48 (1931).

12

Id. at 148.

13

Id.

14

Franz Boas, The Instability of Human Types, in THE IDEA OF RACE 84, 84–88 (Robert Bernasconi &
Tommy Lott eds., 2000).
15

Donald Slesinger, Book Review, 38 YALE L. J. 690, 694–96 (1928–29).

16

See, e.g., Note, Constitutionality of Educational Segregation, 17 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 208, 210 n.13
(1949); Note, Segregation in Public Schools – A Violation of “Equal Protection of the Laws,” 56 YALE L. J. 1059, 1061
(1947).

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

FRANKENBERG-FORMATTED[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

70

12/5/2011 6:35 PM

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 15

In these legal publications, there also was specific discussion of how the new social
science knowledge of race invalidated Plessy. For example, a Note in the Yale Law Journal,
commenting on the Mendez v. Westminster case17 stated that “[m]odern sociological and
psychological studies lend much support to the District Court’s views” that schools should be
open to all children regardless of race or ethnicity.18 The author of the unsigned Note declared
that “[e]very authority on psychology and sociology” agrees that segregation injured students and
cited a variety of contemporary social science evidence to expand upon this point.19
Contemporary law journals in the years preceding the consideration of the school
segregation cases discussed ways in which new understanding about race might challenge legal
precedent. I next examine whether these scientific ideas influenced the four lower federal courts
that considered challenges to segregated K-12 schools in the early 1950s.
II. THE INFLUENCE OF PAST IDEAS AND CUSTOMS ABOUT RACE: PRINCE
EDWARD COUNTY, VIRGINIA
In a short, unanimous opinion, a three-judge court in Prince Edward County, Virginia
rejected black plaintiffs’ arguments that segregation deprived them of their constitutional rights.20
The court decided that they could not determine factually whether the plaintiffs’ evidence, offered
by “[e]minent educators, anthropologies, psychologists and psychiatrists,” was more persuasive
than the defendants’ “equally distinguished and qualified educationists and leaders in the other
fields.”21
Instead, they held that there was ample legal precedent to determine the
constitutionality of segregation in schools.22 Ironically, after stating that they could not
distinguish which of the two parties presented stronger social science testimony, the opinion still
relied more on outdated ideas and customs about race embedded in Virginia’s history to
legitimize segregated schools than it did on legal precedent.23
While the opinion discusses the history of segregation in Virginia, it contains little
discussion of the concept of race or the role of racial discrimination in Virginian society. In fact,
the judges used the long history of racial separation in Virginia as further reason why the
separation of white and black students was reasonable.24 The judges wrote,
It indisputably appears from the evidence that the separation provision rests
neither upon prejudice, nor caprice, nor upon any other measureless foundation.
Rather the proof is that it declares one of the ways of life in Virginia.

17

Mendez v. Westminster Sch. Dist. of Orange Cnty., 161 F.2d 774, 777 (9th Cir. 1947) (questioning the
validity of Plessy in a California district that segregated Mexican-American students).
18

Note, Segregation in Public Schools, supra note 16, at 1060.

19

Id. at 1061.

20

Davis v. County Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 103 F. Supp. 337, 337–38, 340–41 (E.D.Va. 1952).

21

Id. at 338.

22

Id. at 339.

23

Id.

24

See id. at 339–40. “Reasonable” was a term used by the Plessy majority. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537, 550–51 (1896). Part of the Justices’ rationale in Plessy was based on their belief that racial distinctions were
reasonable and would invariably be made—even though they also reserved the right of each state to determine who was
colored. Thus, this “invariable” distinction, in reality, actually differed by state. Id.
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Separation of white and colored ‘children’ in the public schools of Virginia has
for generations been a part of the mores of her people.25
The court cited two arguments to support this declaration. First, the judges recited the
history of clauses in Virginia law providing for the provision of public education beginning in the
years following the Civil War through 1950, but only if white and “colored” students were
educated in separate schools.26 They attributed significance to these rules, noting that the school
segregation clauses were “the only racial segregation direction contained in the constitution of
Virginia.”27 Second, the judges argued that school segregation had “begotten greater
opportunities for the Negro” while involuntarily eliminating segregated schools would harm
public education and students of both races.28 The court supported this argument primarily by
relying on the testimony of the president of the University of Virginia, because they “believe him
[to be] delicately sensible of the customs, minds, and the temper of both races in Virginia.”29 The
unnamed president offered a “candid and knowledgeable discussion of the problem,” namely that
segregated schools were “[s]o ingrained and wrought in the texture of [the public’s] life” that to
end this practice would diminish public interest in, and their financial support of, schools.30 His
belief that support for school systems would wane if the practice of segregation were to be ended
by the courts had particular resonance for the judges who pointed out that a considerable majority
of the residents were white. The court concluded that this was a “reasonable basis” to continue
the practice of school segregation.31
The decision did not cite any legal precedent or social science evidence in the section of
the opinion explaining how segregation was a way of life in Virginia, which is indicative itself of
implicit ideas about the role of race in their society. Yet, the court found that school segregation
had not hurt students of either race and was seemingly most concerned about the potential harm of
ending the long-accepted custom of separating students by race.32 In so doing, the judges
dismissed the question of whether segregated schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Their
opinion was similar to, and repeatedly cited, the Briggs opinion written a year earlier in South
Carolina.33 The Briggs decision is discussed in Part V.
III. BROWN V. BOARD, TOPEKA, KANSAS: FINDINGS OF FACT, FOLLOWING
THE COURT
Unlike the rigid Jim Crow laws of southern states, Kansas law only required school
segregation at the elementary level, and then only in cities with a population greater than
15,000.34 While the Kansas law gave the Topeka school board the opportunity to end school

25

Davis, 103 F.Supp. at 339.

26

Id.

27

Id.

28

Id. at 340.

29

Id.

30

Id.

31

Davis, 103 F.Supp. at 340.

32

Id.

33

See generally Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529 (1951).

34

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 484 n.1 (1954).
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segregation, the school board denied the NAACP’s request to do so.35 The Topeka case
chronologically followed the South Carolina case (Briggs), which had been the NAACP LDF’s
first use of social science to complement its legal arguments about the inherent inequality of
segregation.36 The plaintiffs, led by Robert Carter, assembled a team of social scientists who
testified not only about material differences between the educational environments for black and
white children in Topeka, but whose testimony reinforced the conclusion that attending statesanctioned segregated schools harmed black children.37 This conclusion was essential to arguing
that segregated schools violated the black students’ right to equal opportunity.
In response to the plaintiffs’ contention that segregation violated their rights, the threejudge panel in Kansas candidly admitted that this “poses a question not free from difficulty.”38 In
an opinion written by Circuit Judge Walter A. Huxman, the judges went on to say by way of
explanation that, as a lower court, they were bound by the Supreme Court if they had spoken on a
given issue and could not “substitute [their] own views for the declared law.”39 Having found that
Topeka’s white and colored schools were substantially equal, the judges relied primarily on the
Plessy decision to justify that segregation was not unequal.40 In doing so, they explicitly refuted
the plaintiffs’ argument that contemporary social science evidence necessitated re-examining
Plessy.41 To support their reliance on legal precedent, the Kansas panel in Brown recounted
several times that the Court in Sweatt and Gong Lum had not reviewed Plessy.42 Yet, they also
had difficulty reconciling the Supreme Court’s treatment of segregation in McLaurin and Sweatt
with Plessy.43 Specifically, in McLaurin and Sweatt, the Court held that segregation was
unconstitutional in the context of higher education.44 Ultimately, the district court narrowly
defined the questions considered in Sweatt and McLaurin as the application of the Equal
35

See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK
AMERICA’S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 394 (1975).
36

Id. at 400.

37

See id. at 419–20.

38

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 98 F. Supp. 797, 798 (D. Kan. 1951).

39

Id.

40

Id.

41

Id. at 798–799.

42

Id. at 799–800. See also Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950). In Gong Lum v. Rice, a decision by the
Supreme Court in 1927, the Justices determined that the state of Mississippi could classify Chinese students as “colored”
for purposes of maintaining white and colored K-12 schools. 275 U.S. 78 (1927). Justice Taft’s unanimous opinion cited
Plessy in part to justify their holding. Id. Notably, even though the Brown decision went on to wrestle with whether the
declaration that separate higher educational facilities were unequal in Sweatt should be applied in the present K-12
context, the decision noted that, “in the late case of Sweatt v. Painter, the Supreme Court again refused to review the
Plessy case” to demonstrate that Plessy’s holdings remained guiding precedent. Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799 (internal
citations omitted).
43

Brown, 98 F.Supp. at 799. See also McLaurin v. Okla. State Regents for Higher Educ. 339 U.S. 637

(1950).
44
In Sweatt, the Supreme Court declared that the separate law school created by the University of Texas to
educate black students (to avoid having to admit black students to its white-only law school) did not provide equal
educational opportunity because segregation from white students limited the educational and future occupational prospects
of students. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633–35. Similarly, in McLaurin, the Court ruled that the plaintiff attending medical school
was handicapped by the requirement that he sit in a separate, designated spot in the classroom, library, and cafeteria,
which prohibited interaction with other students. McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 639–41. This, they reasoned, also provided
unequal preparation for his future profession and was therefore unconstitutional. Id.
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Protection Clause to graduate education only.45 Social science evidence was presented by the
plaintiff’s lawyers about the harms of racial segregation in higher education, but because the
Kansas panel narrowly construed the focus of Sweatt and McLaurin to graduate education, could
not consider this evidence as relevant.46 Huxman’s opinion raised a number of questions about
the applicability of the Plessy decision to public education, but concluded that because Plessy and
Gong Lum had not been overturned by the Court itself, a segregated but equal public school
system like Topeka’s was constitutional.47
In relying on Plessy as prevailing doctrine, the judges in the Kansas case quoted Sweatt:
“nor need we reach petitioner’s contention that Plessy v. Ferguson should be reexamined in the
light of contemporary knowledge respecting . . . the effects of racial segregation.”48 In doing so,
their final judgment of law did not incorporate the substantial testimony of social science
evidence that the LDF lawyers presented about the psychological effect of racial prejudice and
segregation. Perhaps as a compromise, the judges attached nine findings of fact to their decision,
including a finding about the sense of inferiority that results from segregated schools.49 Jack
Greenberg, one of the NAACP LDF lawyers in the Brown case, believed that two findings of this
lower court panel were critical: 1) black and white schools in Topeka were substantially equal;
and 2) no matter how equal the facilities were, segregation injured black children in these
schools.50 This evidence, it would turn out, achieved prominence in the Supreme Court’s decision
three years later, yet there was no mention of the findings of fact in the text of the decision itself.51
Although the judges must have agreed with much of the social science evidence to reach these
conclusions, their ideas about race and racism were not strong enough to override the importance
of the legal precedent of Plessy.
IV. CONSTRAINED BY PRECEDENT: FACT VS. LAW IN DELAWARE
The lower court judge in Delaware, Chancellor Collins Seitz, considered both the social
science evidence and legal precedent and came to two different conclusions about racial
segregation in public schools.52 Seitz, a judge recently promoted from vice-chancellor to
chancellor, began his opinion discussing the testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses in
“education, sociology, psychology, psychiatry and anthropology” whose “qualifications were
fully established.”53 He pointed out that there were “no witnesses in opposition.”54 Relying
heavily on the testimony of one of “America’s foremost psychiatrists,” Seitz concluded that state45

Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799–800.

46

Id. According to Mark Tushnet, Thurgood Marshall thought social science evidence would be more
necessary in the K-12 school context than in Sweatt, for example, since the Justices had an “intuitive” understanding of
how segregated legal education might be harmful. MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, THURGOOD
MARSHALL AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1936–1961, at 156–57 (1994).
47

Brown, 98 F. Supp. at 799–800.

48

Id. at 798.

49

KLUGER, supra note 35, at 424.

50

JACK GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT: HOW A DEDICATED BAND OF LAWYERS FOUGHT FOR THE
CIVIL RIGHTS REVOLUTION 131 (1994).
51

See Brown, 98 F. Supp at 797–800.

52

See Belton v. Gebhart, 32 Del. Ch. 343 (1952).

53

Id. at 348.

54

Id.
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imposed segregation might create feelings of inferiority in black students to the point that it might
hinder their education as compared to white students.55
Despite this finding of fact, little evidence exists in the opinion to suggest that Seitz was
aware of, or influenced by, contemporary social sciences understanding of race. Seitz’s focus was
on the effects of a segregated environment in creating a sense of inferiority, and he determined
that segregation created a “mental health problem in many Negro children.”56 Decades earlier,
anthropologist Franz Boas had discussed the effect of a segregated environment based on
observations he had made, primarily focusing on how they caused changes in physical type. He
concluded, however, that “the mental make-up of a certain type of man may be considerably
influenced by his social and geographical environment.”57 Boas’ observations of the environment
challenged the notion of the stability of racial classification. While this could have undermined
prior precedent to the extent that it would not apply to the present case, it was not a question that
Seitz raised in his opinion.
After boldly declaring that segregation resulted in an inferior education, Seitz hastened to
add that this fact did not answer the question of whether segregation violated the Constitution.58
Instead, he believed that it was important to consider decisions of the Supreme Court that spoke to
this issue.59 Although conceding, as plaintiffs had argued, that the Court had never considered a
case regarding the effect of segregation on students, he believed it was fairer to consider a broader
question about the general holdings of the Court with regard to the constitutionality of
segregation.60 Framing the question in such a way led him to Plessy and Gong Lum, the latter
case determining that a “colored” student’s segregated school was constitutional.61 Relying on
these cases as the proper precedent, he believed that the Court had recognized separate could be
equal in elementary and secondary education even though, “this could not be true were my
finding of fact [that segregation creates feelings of inferiority in black students that hinders their
education] given constitutional recognition.”62 Seitz concluded that “while [s]tate-imposed
segregation in lower education provides Negroes with inferior educational opportunities, such
inferiority has not yet been recognized by the United States Supreme Court as violating the
Fourteenth Amendment. . . . It is for that Court to re-examine its doctrine in the light of my
finding of fact.”63
Once Seitz concluded that, according to legal precedent, segregation was not in violation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, he then turned to the question of whether separate was equal in the
New Castle County, Delaware schools.64 His lengthy analysis of this issue considered a variety of
common measures—length of students’ journeys to school, the school’s facilities, the educational

55

See id.

56

Id.

57

Boas, supra note 14, at 88.

58

Belton v. Gebhart, 87 A.2d 863, 865 (Del. Ch. 1952).

59

Id.

60

Id.

61

See Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S. 78 (1927). In fact, in Gong Lum, the Court declared that the question of
whether segregated schools were constitutional was easier than that of the segregated railroad cars under consideration in
Plessy. Id.
62

Belton, 87 A.2d at 865.

63

Id. at 866.

64

Id. at 868.
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qualifications of faculty members, class size, and curricular and extracurricular activity
offerings.65 In fact, he personally visited the specific white and black schools that were at issue.66
Seitz brushed aside arguments by the defendants that in some aspects the Negro schools were
superior.67 Rather, his comparison of schools led him to write, for example, “[i]f this be a harsh
test, then I answer that a State which divides its citizens should pay the price.”68 Comparing the
education offered to students in black schools with that offered to students in white schools, he
concluded that the State had violated the rights of the plaintiffs by denying them admission to the
white school.69 Despite the arguments of the defendants that equalization plans for the black
schools were in progress, he ordered the immediate admission of plaintiffs and other similarly
situated students to the white schools.70 Further, he placed the burden on the school board at
some later date when students were offered an equal education to prove that such access was
unnecessary.71
Although Seitz explicitly recognized the value of new social science evidence in
concluding on the harmful impact of state-imposed segregation, he evidently did not believe that
the evidence was strong enough to render past legal decisions irrelevant.72 In a conflict of judicial
precedent and current “facts,” the former proved a stronger influence in Seitz’s decision, a
conclusion that was upheld by a three-judge Delaware Supreme Court panel that reviewed his
decision.73 The panel did not review the Chancellor’s finding that segregation harmed students
because they concluded that he was correct in determining that this finding did not affect the
determination of whether segregation was in violation of the Constitution. Nor did they argue
with his finding of inferior educational opportunities, and instead agreed that the Supreme Court
should be the court to say that segregation is unconstitutional.74
In fact, the three-judge panel upholding Seitz’s lower court decision was similarly
unaffected by contemporary understanding of race. Although there is no explicit consideration of
race or racial understanding in the decision, in the beginning of his Delaware Supreme Court
opinion, Chief Justice Southerland referred to plaintiffs as “citizens of Negro blood.”75 This
description echoed a nineteenth century understanding of race as being biologically determined, a
view that by the 1950s was discredited. The Plessy decision also used blood as a way of defining
race, referring to the “colored blood” of plaintiff Homer Plessy who appeared white but was oneeighth black (and therefore considered black according to the one-drop rule).76
In a decision affirmed by the higher court, Seitz ultimately believed that legal precedent
prevented him from ruling that segregated schools, in principle, were unconstitutional despite his
factual finding that segregated schools created inferior educational opportunities for black
65

Id. at 866–71.

66

Id. at 866.

67

Id. at 867.

68

Id. at 868.

69

Id. at 871.

70

Belton, 87 A.2d at 871.

71

Id. at 870.

72

Id. at 865.

73

Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 142 (Del. 1952).

74

Id.

75

Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 139 (Del. 1952).

76

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 541 (1896).
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students. Yet, plaintiffs in the Delaware case were the only plaintiffs in the four cases to be
granted admission to white schools as relief to their claims on the second issue in their case,
specifically the equality of the segregated schools in question.
V. THE BRIGGS’ MAJORITY FOCUS ON PRECEDENT
Briggs v. Elliott, in South Carolina, was the only decision with a dissent, although the
majority affirmed the legality of South Carolina’s segregation practices. The majority opinion in
Briggs, written by Fourth Circuit Judge John Parker77 and joined by District Judge George
Timmerman,78 contained no explicit discussion of race. Parker’s opinion repeatedly emphasized
the importance of constitutional precedent and the legislative branch in determining whether
segregation was wise policy. In fact, it even suggested that if the court abolished segregation
where equal schools existed, it would threaten the very existence of the constitutional system.79
For Parker and Timmerman, social science theories about the role of race in classifying
and segregating students, as well as the harms that result from such actions, were not strong
enough to overturn a large body of law permitting segregated schooling that they saw as
“reasonable.”80 In addition, their majority opinion downplayed the significance of social science
theories influencing judicial ideas about race. In contrast to Chancellor Seitz who wrestled with
the conflict of legal precedent and what he believed to be contradictory findings of fact, Judge
Parker’s opinion was dismissive of theories of educators and sociologists, which he believed had
little bearing on constitutional law.81 The opinion noted that segregation was not in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment, asserting, “we think that this conclusion is supported by
overwhelming authority which we are not at liberty to disregard on the basis of theories advanced
by a few educators and sociologists.”82

77
Judge Parker was the chief judge of the Fourth Circuit, and, according to Jack Greenberg, was liked by
Thurgood Marshall. See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at 121. The NAACP had achieved
several early civil rights victories in Judge Parker’s courtroom, including affirming Judge Waring’s lower court decision
invalidating the white primary in North Carolina. See KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 303.
78
Judge Waring described Judge Timmerman, the third member of this three-judge panel, as an avowed
segregationist, while Kluger described him as an “out-spoken advocate of white supremacy.” See JULIUS WATIES
WARING, ORAL HISTORY PROJECT AT COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY, REMINISCENCES OF JULIUS WATIES WARING 358 (1957);
KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 303.
79

See Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 537 (D.S.C. 1951).

80

Id.

81

Id. at 536.

82

Id. at 537. The NAACP Legal Defense Fund (LDF) presented social science experts from a number of
prominent universities in the Briggs case including Horace McNally, a professor at Teachers College, Columbia
University, who argued that separating students implied stigma; Ellis Knox, education professor at Howard University,
who stated that segregation cannot exist without disadvantage to the minority group; Kenneth Clark, professor of
psychology at City College, presented his findings of black inferiority due to segregated schools based on his doll studies;
and Louis Kesselman, professor of political science at University of Louisville, who said segregation prevented students
from understanding the needs and interests of both groups. See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at
123. Additionally, the LDF lawyers read into the record, from the Sweatt case, testimony of Robert Redfield, a law
professor at University of Chicago in which he discussed evidence that there had not been differences between Negroes
and whites in intellectual capacity or inability to learn. Id. at 125. According to Judge Waring’s dissent, other social
science experts were unable to make it to South Carolina due to maneuvers by the school board. Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at
540. Because of the school district’s surprising admission that their schools were not equal, a remarkably short defense,
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The two judges bolstered their opinion by relying on the traditional belief in the
supremacy of law, which governed legal thinking and placed heavy emphasis on preexisting
law.83 If followed to its fullest extent, this prevented new ideas about race from affecting judicial
decisions. The majority opinion cited and quoted extensively from Plessy and Gong Lum as
precedent for the constitutionality of segregating black and white children despite the Supreme
Court’s more recent higher education decisions of McLaurin and Sweatt.84 They also took
considerable pains to point out the many areas—including states outside the South—where
segregated schools prevailed.85 Finally, to vindicate their position, they cited a decision from the
District of Columbia in the previous year that called attention to the difficulties that occur when
people of more than one race coexist in the same area, a problem that was insoluble by force,
according to the opinion.86
Similar to the Virginia opinion the following year, Parker and Timmerman neglected to
examine the racial customs of South Carolina and how those customs affected their ruling. They
wrote, “[t]he classification of children for the purpose of education in separate schools has a basis
grounded in reason and experience; and, if equal facilities are afforded, it cannot be condemned as
discriminatory. . . .”87 This statement is indicative of a belief in the validity of racial
classifications that had long been the custom in South Carolina society; yet it was a belief that
was extensively questioned by social scientists at the time.
VI. THE LONE DISSENTER
The dissenting judge in the Briggs case, and, in fact, the only dissenting judge among the
more than a dozen lower court judges to hear the original four cases that were consolidated in
1952 before the Supreme Court as Brown v. Board of Education was J. Waties Waring, a district
court judge in the Eastern District of South Carolina. Waring wrote a vigorous dissent as a
member of the three-judge panel hearing Briggs v. Elliot. Although he later commented that he
viewed Chief Justice Earl Warren’s Brown decision as much more eloquent than his,88 Waring’s
dissent goes into greater discussion of race than Warren’s or any other judge involved in the
school segregation decisions. In ultimately declaring that segregation violated the Fourteenth
Amendment, Waring not only lamented the effect of the practice of racial discrimination (in the
form of state-imposed school segregation) on black children, but he also challenged the very
notion of race as a concept.89 To some extent, his dissent both addressed the opinion of the
Briggs majority, and dialogued with the Plessy majority of over fifty years earlier.

and the impatience of Judge Parker to wait for more social science testimony, the other LDF experts did not make it to
South Carolina prior to closing arguments. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE, supra note 35, at 358–63.
83

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 537.

84

Id. at 532–35.

85

Id. at 537.

86

See Carr v. Corning, 182 F.2d 14 (D.C. Cir. 1950).

87

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 536.

88

See WARING, ORAL HISTORY, supra note 78, at 365.

89

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542.

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2011

FRANKENBERG-FORMATTED[1].DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

78

UNIV. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE

12/5/2011 6:35 PM

[Vol. 15

A. Questioning “Race”
Waring began his dissent by praising the plaintiffs for bringing the Briggs case, noting
that it “must have cost much in effort and financial expenditures” despite the “long established
and age-old pattern of the way of life” that had existed in South Carolina “since and as a result of
the institution of human slavery.”90 While the Briggs majority relied upon this “way of life” as
rationale for their holding, Waring criticized the defendants and the court for using this as an
excuse for avoiding the question of whether “segregation in education in our schools is legal” and
whether this was permitted under the guarantees of the U.S. Constitution.91
Important to Waring’s reasoning about the nature of school segregation was the
country’s history of inequitable treatment on the basis of race. In instituting human slavery in the
United States, Waring noted “[s]lavery was nothing new in the world.”92 Discussing various
forms of slavery, he suggested that it “perhaps reached its worst form in Nazi Germany.”93
Waring contextualized the adoption of the 13th, 14th and 15th Amendments as a way of eradicating
slavery and part of the world’s “great awakening” that began with philosophers and religious
leaders.94 Indeed, he portrayed their adoption as practically inevitable in order for the country to
endorse the principles of the Declaration of Independence.95 Thus, he found it “unnecessary” to
sort through “voluminous arguments and opinions” to ascertain what the Fourteenth Amendment
meant.96 He believed that anyone “of ordinary ability and understanding of the English language”
would know that it was intended to eliminate “all idea of discrimination and difference between
American citizens.”97 This contrasted directly with the majority’s opinion in Plessy, which
remarked that racial distinctions would invariably be made.98
In considering whether South Carolina’s laws conflicted with the “true meaning” of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Waring further challenged previous judicial discussions of race by
charging that they had “been intermingled with sophistry and prejudice.”99 By 1951, Justice
Harlan’s Plessy dissent was one of the few judicial opinions in opposition to segregation.
Although it was a decision about transportation and not about public schools, Plessy was
subsequently cited as precedent to justify school segregation. Even Harlan’s dissent had not
questioned the validity of racial classification and, in fact, had acknowledged a racial hierarchy.100
90

Id. at 540. Waring’s opening narrative omits the beginning of this historic case. Waring later commented
that Marshall would not have challenged the constitutionality of segregated schools had Waring not forced him to
withdraw his earlier case that simply challenged the equality of schools in Clarendon County, South Carolina. See
WARING, supra note 78, at 344–345. Greenberg suggested that Waring, having grown estranged from Charleston society,
wanted to confront segregation directly and thus urged Marshall to re-file his case to do so. See GREENBERG, CRUSADERS
IN THE COURT, supra note 50, at 122; TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, supra note 46, at 157–58.
91

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 541.

92

Id.

93

Id.

94

Id.

95

Id.

96

Id.

97

Id. at 541–42.

98

See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896).

99

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542.

100

Harlan’s dissent has long been held up even by LDF lawyers, who argued the segregation cases that
culminated in Brown, as a ringing endorsement of the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, but a closer reading shows
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Waring, however, questioned the arbitrary nature of defining races, echoing the arguments of
Albion Tourgee who represented Homer Plessy over fifty years earlier.101 Waring asked, “What
possible definition can be found for the so-called white race, Negro race or other races? Who is to
decide and what is the test?”102 Highlighting the arbitrary nature of racial classification, Tourgee
had suggested if “separate but equal” was adopted for separating two races, then such laws could
also exist separating those whose hair was different colors or who were different nationalities.103
Social scientists for several decades prior to Brown had questioned conceptions of race.
Ashley Montagu, for example, proposed in the early 1940s that the concept of race is “utterly
erroneous and meaningless” and “has done an infinite amount of harm and no good at all.”104
Reference to blood was a common response in defining the race of a person in the nineteenth
century and also in legal decisions; the majority opinion in Plessy, for example, described the
petitioner as a mixture of Caucasian and African blood.105 Despite the fact that “the mixture of
colored blood was not discernible in him,” he was considered colored under Louisiana’s statute.106
Even as late as 1952, the Delaware Supreme Court that reviewed Seitz’s decision referred to the
plaintiffs as being of Negro blood.107 Not unaware of this history, Waring directly challenged this
perception of race, and in doing so, the entire system of separating students according to race. He
wrote, “[s]cience tells us that there are but four kinds of blood: A, B, AB and O, and these are
found in Europens [sic], Asiatics, Africans, Americans and others.”108 Dismissively, he
continued, “we need not further consider the irresponsible and baseless references to preservation
of ‘Caucasian blood.’”109
a similar conception of race to that of the Plessy majority and a belief in white supremacy. See TINSLEY E. YARBROUGH,
JUDICIAL ENIGMA: THE FIRST JUSTICE HARLAN 227–29 (1995). Where Harlan differs from the majority, causing him to
dissent, is that he believed that the country’s laws protected the civil rights of all men. Id. In other words, he believed in
legal equality but not social equality between whites and blacks. Id. He had explained these views earlier when running for
governor of Kentucky in 1871, twenty-five years earlier. Harlan advocated full legal equality between the races despite
saying that he believed social equality could never exist in Kentucky and that it was proper to segregate Negro and white
students in school. Alan F. Westin, John Marshall Harlan and the Constitutional Rights of Negroes: The Transformation
of a Southerner, 66 YALE L.J. 637, 662–63 (1957).
101

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542.

102

Id.

103

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. Harlan briefly echoes Tourgee’s questioning of the arbitrary nature of laws
regulating behavior on the basis of race, asking “why may not the state require the separation in railroad coaches of native
and naturalized citizens of the United States, or of Protestants and Roman Catholics?” Id. at 558.
104

Ashley Montagu, The Concept of Race in the Human Species in the Light of Genetics, in THE IDEA OF
RACE 100, 101 (Robert Bernasconi & Tommy Lott eds., 2000).
105

Likewise, the Court’s 1927 Gong Lum decision, which confirmed the applicability of Plessy to public
education, referred to blood to determine that the plaintiff, a Chinese student, was “colored.” Gong Lum v. Rice, 275 U.S.
78, 78 (1927).
106

Plessy, 163 U.S. at 538.

107

Gebhart v. Belton, 91 A.2d 137, 139 (1952).

108

Briggs v. Elliott, 98 F. Supp. 529, 542 (D.S.C. 1951).

109

Id. Defenders of school segregation often raised the specter of intermarriage as a further reason schools
should remain segregated. For example, white Southern attorney generals filed an amicus brief in Sweatt saying that they
did not want “their women in intimate social contact with Negro men.” PETER IRONS & STEPHANIE GUITTON, MAY IT
PLEASE THE COURT: THE MOST SIGNIFICANT ORAL ARGUMENTS SINCE 1955, at 376 (Peter Irons & Stephanie Guitton
eds., 1993). There are more recent examples of this biological basis of race persisting in judicial thought. For example,
during oral arguments of a case about racial preferences in government contracting, Justice Antonin Scalia argued that a
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Attacking the notion of race further, Waring specifically questioned the proportions
South Carolina had delineated as determining one’s race, namely that someone who was oneeighth or more of African ancestry was considered to be a “Negro”.110 He questioned this
proportion and whether it was based on any “reason” (a term frequently used in the majority’s
decision in Briggs as well as Plessy).111 He further questioned how those assigning children
would even be able to tell who was white and who was Negro.112 Carrying the law’s logic to its
fullest extent, he rhetorically asked why the state should not establish a series of schools so that
students of each percentage of African and Caucasian blood would not have to mix with students
of different combinations.113 He answered himself, “the whole thing is unreasonable, unscientific,
and based upon unadulterated prejudice.”114 This was in direct contradiction of the majority’s
opinion that classifying and segregating students in schools was “grounded in reason and
experience.”115
Before Waring even discussed legal precedent—and perhaps in response to the
majority’s criticism of social science theories, he had not cited any social science references to
support his argument—he indicated his belief in the absurdity of race as a concept and as a means
of classification.116 Mentioning that scientific understanding undermined the legal understanding
of “blood” as a means of separating races, Waring challenged the very basis of Plessy and
subsequent decisions that the other judges, including the other members of the Briggs panel,
upheld as precedent.117
B. The Practice of Racial Discrimination
Walter Jackson argued that Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal’s An American Dilemma
had a strong effect on both intellectuals and policymakers from the 1940s to 1960s in
“establishing a liberal orthodoxy around the ideas of integration,” but Jackson ultimately found
that this was a somewhat limiting view in the realm of school segregation because, by focusing on
prejudice as the source on inequality, it ignored the structural sources of racism.118 Further, by
emphasizing the harm of segregation to African American students, Myrdal’s work also neglected
a careful discussion of structures of African American resistance.119
An avowed reader of Myrdal’s An American Dilemma, perhaps it is not surprising that
Waring was also sensitive to the role of prejudice in affecting children in segregated schools.

policy giving racial and gender preferences was only about “blood . . . blood, not background and environment.” Neil
Gotanda, A Critique of our Constitution is Color-Blind, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: KEY WRITINGS THAT FORMED THE
MOVEMENT 257, 261 (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995).
110

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 542.

111

Id.

112

Id.

113

Id.

114

Id.

115

Id. at 536.

116

Id. at 542.

117

Id.

118

WALTER A. JACKSON, GUNNAR MYRDAL AND AMERICA’S CONSCIENCE: SOCIAL ENGINEERING AND
RACIAL LIBERALISM, 1938-1987, at xviii (1990).
119

Id. at xix.
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After his challenge of the nature of defining racial groups, Waring discussed studies and
testimony of the plaintiffs’ expert witnesses that demonstrated the harmful effect of segregation
on children.120 Saying there was “absolutely no reasonable explanation for racial prejudice,” he
disagreed with the majority’s determination that such classifications that resulted from this
prejudice were reasonable.121 Moreover, Waring saw racial prejudice as acquired, not natural or
inherited.122 Segregation, particularly in younger children, aided the acquisition of prejudice,
which was later difficult to change.123 Waring implicitly drew upon social science evidence from
Boas to Myrdal to emphasize the harmful nature of the practice of racial discrimination.
Interestingly, Waring suggested a rationale for prior judicial decisions regarding
segregation as he sought to buttress his dissent with legal precedent. Noting that the Plessy
decision came at a time when blacks were either former slaves themselves or children of former
slaves, he suggested that this was why blacks were viewed as inferior by the Justices.124 Waring
cited law in a variety of different twentieth-century contexts that had removed racial
classification.125 Waring’s conception of what could be called racial liberalism in the judicial
system in 1951—noting that the Plessy majority relied on pre-Civil War precedent126—was
perhaps overstated in trying to support his opinion.127 Waring, however, argued that Briggs was
not a case about railroad accommodations, and that too much time had already been wasted in
trying to make such comparisons.128 Instead, he focused on the Court’s recent decisions in Sweatt
and McLaurin to argue that the Court’s trend had been to declare that segregation in education
was illegal.129 Waring’s reliance on the higher education cases contrasted with the Briggs
majority, who painstakingly delineated the facts in the current case from the facts of the higher
education cases as their reasoning for why Plessy, but not Sweatt and McLaurin, applied to public
school segregation.130
C. Influences on Waring’s Thinking
What caused this one judge, a native in one of the Deep South states, to question what
were commonly accepted ideas about race in judicial history and his own upper-class Charleston
society?

120

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 547.

121

Id.

122

Id. at 547.

123

Id.

124

Id. at 544.

125

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 543–44. In fact, citations to these cases were some of the only footnotes in Judge
Waring’s entire dissent, and none were to any books, articles, or other social science evidence. For example, he cited
cases about peonage, transportation, criminals, housing, labor, suffrage, and higher education. Id.
126

Id. at 544.

127

Lani Guinier defines racial liberalism as “reject[ing] scientific racism and discredit[ing] its postulate of
inherent black inferiority.” Lani Guinier, From Racial Liberalism to Racial Literacy: Brown v. Board of Education and
the Interest-Divergence Dilemma, 91 J. OF AM. HIST. 92, 100 (2004).
128

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 544–45.

129

See KLUGER, supra note 35 at 266–67.

130

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 545.
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1. Contemporary Social Science Understanding of “Race”
Waring had decided several cases regarding race before the Briggs case, which he later
said:
[made him] begin to think an awful lot because every time you looked into one
of these things, the less reason you can see for resistance to what we commonly
call the American creed of equality of all citizens of this country . . . you saw
the old sophistry of trying to keep within the law, but declaring two classes of
citizens, and that Negroes or people of partial Negro descent were not treated as
ordinary American human beings, but were put in a separate classification . . .
.131
Waring further talked about the influence of reading Myrdal’s An American Dilemma (echoing, as
quoted above, Myrdal’s notion of an American Creed) and Cash’s The Mind of the South.132
These books helped Waring to understand the complexity of racial matters. His solution to
dealing with this complexity was simply to reject distinctions made on the basis of race.
Speaking in the mid 1950s, Waring further discussed the racial ideas that influenced his
thinking in deciding the Briggs case, commenting on Kenneth Clark’s testimony that segregation
had “this deleterious effect [that] not only applied to Negro children, that it gave them the
inferiority feeling . . . but that it had an equally bad effect on white children, because it gave them
the idea that they were a race apart and separate.”133 He lamented that racial segregation created
the idea of separate races in the minds of white and black students, which he saw as a false idea.
But what seemed central to his skepticism of the Plessy doctrine were questions about the very
meaning of race. He mused:
[I]f the people of the United States want to say that only people who come from
the so-called Caucasian race can vote . . . . I won’t like it and I don’t know how
they can enforce it, because I don’t know what the Caucasian race is and I don’t
think anybody else knows. It’s an entirely false idea that was based on the fact
that a fellow . . . discovered a skull in the Caucasus that he thought was the
finest type of human race, and he called it the Caucasian race. Webster
[dictionary], I believe, describes the Anglo-Saxon race as a mixed race. I think
all races are mixed races.134

131

WARING, supra note 78, at 235–36.

132

Contemporary reviews of Cash’s The Mind of the South were somewhat positive. A reviewer in The
Journal of Negro History commented on Cash’s “incomplete emancipation” from Southern society, but hailed it as a
“courageous and daring statement of the truth” of the “tardiness of [the South’s] progress.” W.M. Brewer, 26 J. OF NEGRO
HIST. 253, 253–55 (1941) (reviewing W.J. CASH, THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941)). See also C. Vann Woodward, 7 J. S.
HIST. 400, 400–01 (1941) (reviewing W.J. CASH., THE MIND OF THE SOUTH (1941)). More recently, however, critics have
found much to condemn in Cash’s book, including his blindness as a white Southern man to issues of power and sexuality.
See NELL IRVIN PAINTER, SOUTHERN HISTORY ACROSS THE COLOR LINE 178–98 (2002).
133

WARING, supra note 78, at 354.

134

WARING, supra note 78, at 269–70.
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Given such feelings about the idea of “race,”135 it is not surprising that Waring was opposed to
accepting the constitutionality of schools that segregated students based on a concept whose
validity he doubted existed and the application of which he viewed as being detrimental to the
opportunities of black students.
2. Race and Awareness of Larger Context
A widely accepted view among historians today is the importance of Cold War ideology
in forcing the U.S. government to deal domestically with racial inequality. In its briefs to the
Court in the Brown case, the Justice Department relied heavily on national security issues,
arguing that school segregation was unconstitutional and “presents an unsolved problem for
American democracy, an inescapable challenge to the sincerity of our espousal of the democratic
faith.”136 The Justice Department argued that the existence of racial discrimination against
African Americans had harmed the country’s relationships with other countries and perception by
the foreign press, the United Nations, and was part of the Soviet Union’s propaganda against the
U.S. The brief closed with an emphasis on the potential impact of an anti-segregation statement
by the Court on international perceptions of the United States.137 Legal historian Mary Dudziak
argues that the federal government’s response to civil rights was one that was constantly governed
by attempts to promote the ideals of democracy abroad, and that during the early years of the Cold
War, civil rights reforms were critical to the government’s narrative of race and democracy.138
Dudziak’s analysis provides another example as to how the global context offered African
Americans an opportunity to gain leverage with white Americans that was often difficult to
achieve in the United States.139
In his dissent, Waring expressed his disappointment at the opinion of his fellow district
court judges in South Carolina.140 This was not the first time; in an earlier civil rights case
regarding the constitutionality of an all-white primary, he had called on South Carolina to finally
rejoin the Union.141 In Briggs, he wrote soberly that he thought the issue of school segregation
was:
[C]lear and important, particularly at this time when our national leaders are
called upon to show to the world that our democracy means what it says and

135

These comments were made in the mid 1950s, several years after his decision and after the unanimous
Brown decision. These decisions along with the passage of time may have made him only more adamant in his rejection
of race as a means for separating and segregating students.
136

Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5), 1952 WL 82045 at *31.
137

Mary L. Dudziak, Brown as a Cold War Case, 91 J. AM. HIST. 32, 34 (2004).

138

See generally MARY L. DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY (2000) (arguing that the Cold War helped advance a civil rights agenda, as American leaders didn’t want
American Racism to tarnish its international image).
139
During earlier eras, other prominent African Americans including Frederick Douglass and Ida B. Wells
have effectively appealed to foreigners when they lacked the ability to improve racial equality domestically.
140

Briggs, 98 F. Supp. at 548.

141

See Elmore v. Rice, 72 F. Supp. 516, 526–27 (1947).
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that it is a true democracy and there is no under-cover suppression of the rights
of any of our citizens because of the pigmentation of their skins.142
In describing the U.S.’s history of slavery on the basis of racial distinctions, Waring
linked this practice to the recent atrocities in Nazi Germany due to notions of racial superiority.143
Although he did not explicitly cite him, the influence of Myrdal’s writing is apparent as Waring
expressed dismay at the practice of racial discrimination, and its conflict with his interpretation of
the Constitution and the American creed.
Writing over a half-century before Waring, Justice Harlan expressed a similar concern
for how the Plessy majority’s decision contradicted the United States’ position relative to the rest
of the world. He wrote,
We boast of the freedom enjoyed by our people above all other peoples. But it
is difficult to reconcile that boast with a state of the law which, practically, puts
the brand of servitude and degradation upon a large class of our fellow-citizens,
our equals before the law. The thin disguise of “equal” accommodations for
passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong
this day done.144
Even at the close of the nineteenth century, Justice Harlan was uncomfortable enough with the
contradictions between America’s proclamation of freedom to other nations and their treatment of
some citizens because of ideas about race and racial discrimination. It is interesting that the two
judges to question the prevailing judicial ideas of race in Plessy and Briggs—albeit to a differing
extent and at times when scientific notions about the concept of “race” were quite different—both
noted the discrepancy between the majority opinion’s treatment of race and the contemporary
ideals of the country as they would be viewed in a global context.
VII. CONCLUSION
There was a variation in the extent that new social science understandings about race and
racial classification informed the rulings of the lower court judges in the early 1950s as they
considered four challenges to segregated schools brought by the NAACP LDF. District court
judges are expected to base their decisions on prior decisions by higher courts on related issues, as
well as the facts of the case as presented in their courtrooms. With the exception of Judge
Waring, the other judges who heard school segregation cases prior to the Supreme Court in 1952
all voted to affirm the Plessy precedent that separate could be equal. The majority opinions in the
South Carolina and Virginia cases, the two cases in the South, were the least receptive to
incorporating contemporary scientific ideas about race that challenged legal precedent or, perhaps
more significantly, deeply ingrained customs in their society. The opinions from outside the
South—Delaware and Kansas, former slave states but not part of the Confederacy—were more
sympathetic to the social science evidence presented. However, despite findings of fact in both
opinions that segregation harmed children in segregated schools, the judges still felt bound by
legal precedent to rule that segregated schools did not violate the Constitution. Ironically, despite
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the fact that these decisions affirmed Plessy, they ultimately had more of an immediate impact on
ending segregation than Waring’s dissent. In Delaware, black students were admitted to white
schools deemed to be superior to existing black schools, and the findings of fact in the Kansas
case were incorporated into the Supreme Court’s Brown decision.
Yet, Waring, a native of Charleston and a member of its elite society, presented with the
same social science evidence and arguments about appropriate legal precedents, not only agreed
with the plaintiffs about the harmful practice of racial discrimination in segregating students, but
questioned the entire basis of racial classification: the concept of race itself. Almost in dialogue
with the Plessy majority, in addition to the majority in the Briggs case, Waring parsed the racial
arguments that had long been used to justify legal separation and demonstrated a keen awareness
of the ideas about race and racial discrimination from social science knowledge, which had been
questioning traditional understandings of inferior and superior races.
To some extent, Waring’s opinion was more radical in its conception of race than even
the monumental Brown decision by a unanimous Supreme Court three years later. By the time
Brown was decided, Waring had left the bench and South Carolina, believing that his Briggs
opinion had ended his usefulness as a judge there.145 The Brown decision was sweeping in
declaring that in the field of public education, segregation was inherently unequal, but the opinion
contained no discussion of race itself and made no mention of Waring’s dissent.146
Towards the end of the fairly short opinion in Brown, Chief Justice Earl Warren
incorporated one of the factual findings that the Kansas judges had appended to their decision: the
finding that segregated schools had a detrimental effect on black children.147 This mention
preceded a short yet heavily contested statement that this finding of inferiority was supported by
modern social science, including a footnote to a series of social science works, most concerning
the effects of racial discrimination, but not race itself.148 ’’The differing and more modest
treatment of race in the Brown decision may be explained by Warren’s need to gain the approval
of the entire Court, as opposed to a dissent in which Waring did not have to compromise with
other judges.’
Outside the South, in the district court decisions leading to Brown, social science made it
difficult for judges to follow what they considered to be binding legal precedent, yet they
ultimately did. Southern majorities summarily dismissed any attempts to question segregation.
Only Waties Waring, in his last major case and writing in dissent, challenged the ideas of race and
racial classification that had long been accepted by the judicial system and, as seen in the majority
opinion in his case, local society. The influence of ideas about race affected the willingness of
district court judges, to varying degrees, to challenge legal precedent in the area of school
segregation, and ultimately set the legal and factual record for the Brown decision, a decision that
forever changed judicial and societal thinking about the practice of racial discrimination.
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